Section II · Location 2 of 4
Section 2 · Open to readFrom The Philosophy of Teaching (De Magistro) by Saint Augustine of Hippo
Edition: The Philosophy of Teaching (De Magistro), trans. Fr. Francis E. Tourscher, O.S.A. (1924)
Chapters V–VIII: Signs of Signs, Reciprocal Words, and the Rules of Discourse Between Augustine and Adeodatus
The Philosophy of Teaching (De Magistro) · Chapter 2 summary
'word' (verbum) and 'noun' (nomen) apply to the same spoken signs. Even so, they signify them under two distinct rational grounds (striking the ear versus knowing in the mind) and all human discourse is governed by a natural law of reason that directs a listener's attention from the spoken sign to the reality it names.
Atlas of Saints wrote this summary of section 2 of The Philosophy of Teaching (De Magistro) by Saint Augustine of Hippo. It uses our own words. It is not a quotation from the book.
Cite this summary
Atlas of Saints. “Chapters V–VIII: Signs of Signs, Reciprocal Words, and the Rules of Discourse Between Augustine and Adeodatus” Summary of The Philosophy of Teaching (De Magistro), by Saint Augustine of Hippo. https://www.atlasofsaints.com/writings/de-magistro/chapters/2#atlas-answer
Section breakdown
In Chapter V, Augustine and Adeodatus examine what happens when signs point to other signs and also include themselves. Some signs, like the word "sign" or the word "word", apply to every spoken term, including themselves. At first glance, the word "noun" (nomen) seems narrower than "word" (verbum), because standard grammar counts eight parts of speech—so that conjunctions like "if" (si), "for" (nam), or "because" (quia) are words. Yet are not classed as nouns.
Augustine then tests Adeodatus on how we speak when we talk about words themselves. A teacher says in grammar, "'If' is a conjunction", or "'Because' is a two-syllable word". In response, the conjunction itself serves as the subject of the verb and can be referred to by a pronoun. Thus, whenever we mention any part of speech as an object of thought, we use it grammatically as a noun. The aim here is to clarify how two terms can relate in breadth. Adeodatus compares "word" and "noun" to "animal" (animal) and "horse" (equus). Every horse is an animal, just as every noun is a word and a sound.
In Chapter VI, Augustine asks whether there are signs that signify each other with completely equal breadth. Augustine leads Adeodatus to see that in their wider philosophical sense, "word" (verbum) and "noun" (nomen) are mutually convertible. Not only is every noun a word. However, every word is also a noun because every spoken sign names something. The aim here is to confirm that even particles and verbs can function as names. Augustine cites the apostle Paul in 2 Corinthians 1:19: "In Christ there was not Yes and No, but in Him was Yes." Here the word "Yes" (Est) is treated directly as a name.
Yet if every noun is a word and every word is a noun, how do the two terms differ? Augustine distinguishes between two kinds of co-extensive terms:
*Pure synonyms across or within languages*, which differ only in the physical sound of their syllables while having no difference in rational ground.
*Terms that signify the exact same objects for two different reasons, like verbum and nomen*.
Augustine drew on Latin etymology. Then he demonstrates that a spoken sign is called a *word (verbum) from its physical striking (verberare) of the ear or from crying out. By contrast, the very same sign is called a noun or name (nomen) from the mind's knowing (noscere*). This is because a name enables the soul to know and remember things.
In Chapter VII, at Augustine's request, Adeodatus delivers a clear summary of everything they have established from Chapter I through Chapter VI. Why we speak (to teach or to call to mind), why Christ taught the Apostles to pray in words even though God hears the silent heart. How words are signs. How signs can be shown by other signs or by bodily actions. Finally, he shows how "word" and "noun" mutually include each other.
Opening Chapter VIII, Augustine pauses to answer a natural doubt. Someone listening to their long discussion of syllables, nouns, and conjunctions might think they are wasting time on childish trifles and clever quibbles. Augustine assures his son that he is not playing an empty game:
If they were studying these rules of speech merely for worldly vanity, it would indeed be trifling.
Instead, they are practicing *preliminary mental exercises (praeludia*) that strengthen the mind's vision by degrees. In doing so, he prepares the soul to endure the heat and light of that region where blessed and eternal life dwells.
Augustine now shows why this training is urgently needed. Without a clear grasp of how signs relate to things, speakers easily fall into dangerous logical traps (captiones). Augustine illustrates the danger with three examples:
*The "Nothing" Fallacy.* Someone argues, "If it is not something, it is nothing; therefore if 'nothing' is a word that signifies, 'nothing' is something". In that case, the listener is baffled unless he separates the spoken sign from the absence of reality.
*The Lion Leaving the Speaker's Mouth.* Referring to a famous jest mentioned by Caecilius, Augustine asks what happens if a sophist argues: "Whatever you say comes out of your mouth; you say 'lion'; therefore a fierce beast comes out of your mouth!" Adeodatus replies at once that what leaves the speaker's mouth is only the vocal sign of a lion, never the animal itself.
*The "Man Is a Noun" Trap: Turning the test directly on Adeodatus, Augustine asks: "What are we?" When Adeodatus answers, "Men" (homines), Augustine asks what part of speech homo* ("man") is. If Adeodatus simply answers "a noun", Augustine can conclude: "Therefore you are a noun, not a living being!"
Adeodatus immediately sees the trap and states the fundamental principle that governs all human communication—the *law of reason (lex rationis*) implanted in our minds:
Whenever we hear spoken signs, *our mind's attention naturally moves straight to the realities signified* rather than stopping at the sound of the word.
Only when the speaker indicates that he is asking about the sign itself do we follow the secondary rule of grammar and treat the word as a linguistic token.
The story inside
The aim here is to test whether Adeodatus can avoid confusing signs with realities. Augustine reminds him of the old joke proving that a wild beast marches out of a speaker's mouth whenever a person utters the word 'lion.' Then Augustine springs a sudden trap: 'Tell me, are we men (homines)? And what part of speech is man (homo)?' Adeodatus sees that admitting 'man is a noun' without qualification would allow Augustine to conclude that they themselves are grammatical nouns rather than living human beings. Then he formulates the natural law of reason (lex rationis). We hear words. In response, our minds naturally look to the real things signified, and only shift to grammar when the question is explicitly about the sign itself.
Lessons worth keeping
- 1
Two terms can apply to the exact same objects. At the same time, he differs in meaning: 'verbum' names a sign from its physical sound striking the ear (verberare), whereas 'nomen' names it from the mind's knowing (noscere).
- 2
Careful philosophical analysis of language is not an empty game. However, a preliminary exercise that strengthens the soul's vision for eternal truth.
- 3
By the natural law of reason (lex rationis) implanted in human minds, listeners automatically direct their attention to the reality signified by a word unless prompted to examine the word itself.
Test your recall
How do 'word' (verbum) and 'noun' (nomen) differ in meaning according to Augustine, and what is the 'law of reason' (lex rationis) that Adeodatus states in Chapter VIII?
Answer from memory first. Then check the summary and lessons above.
Notes & sources
3 notesFrom The Philosophy of Teaching (De Magistro), trans. Fr. Francis E. Tourscher, O.S.A. (1924). Line numbers show where each passage appears in the digitized text.
- 1.Lines 1307–1309
“These all are signified by the one (conjunction); but by not one of these is this quadrisyllabic word signified.”
- 2.Lines 1531–1536
“But, if you ask what individually the realities which they signify are called, that is, what they are named, I can answer only those very parts of speech which they are, which we do not call nouns: though we are convineed, I see, that they are nouns.”
- 3.Lines 1953–1956
“You now see, you, whom I believe to have spoken always knowing and sure of what you said, see whether I have set them forth well and in order.”
