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Summa Theologica

Section 30 · Saint Thomas Aquinas

Section XXX · Location 30 of 80

Section 30 · Open to read

From Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas

Edition: Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part, Questions 47–79: Treatise on Prudence and Justice, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1918)

Second Part of the Second Part — Right, Justice, Judgment, Distributive and Commutative Justice, and Restitution (Questions 57–62)

Summa Theologica · Chapter 30 summary

Justice is the constant and perpetual will to render to each person his due right (jus). In doing so, it orders human beings in their relations with others. Natural right is based on human nature itself. No human decree can ever make what is contrary to natural right lawful.

Atlas of Saints wrote this summary of section 30 of Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas. It uses our own words. It is not a quotation from the book.

Cite this summary

Atlas of Saints. “Second Part of the Second Part — Right, Justice, Judgment, Distributive and Commutative Justice, and Restitution (Questions 57–62)” Summary of Summa Theologica, by Saint Thomas Aquinas. https://www.atlasofsaints.com/writings/summa-theologica/chapters/30#atlas-answer

Section breakdown

Aquinas turns to the second cardinal virtue. Then he begins with the object of justice: 'right' (jus), which is the fair or equal thing owed to another person. Right is divided into natural right (grounded in the very nature of things) and positive right, established by human agreement or public authority, which loses all force if it contradicts natural right. Justice itself is 'the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right', residing in the rational will and ordering a person in relation to others. Its judgment requires authority, rectitude of will, and prudence, forbidding rashly interpreting a neighbor's doubtful actions for the worse. Justice is divided into two species—distributive justice (allotting common goods proportionally according to merit) and commutative justice (governing mutual exchanges between two persons by strict arithmetic equality). Moreover, it requires full restitution whenever another's property or reputation has been unjustly taken.

In Questions 57–59, Thomas Aquinas defines right (`jus`) as the object of justice. In addition, he separates natural right from positive right and the law of nations (`jus gentium`). Moreover, he marks out justice as the constant habit of the will rendering to each his due, with general (legal) justice directing all virtues to the common good. Question 57 distinguishes civic right between free citizens from paternal and domestic right within the household. In Question 60, Aquinas shows that lawful judgment requires justice, prudence, and public jurisdiction, condemns rash judgment born of groundless suspicion. Teaches that unless clear evidence proves otherwise, a Christian must interpret doubtful things in his neighbor's favor.

Question 60 defines judgment as the right determination of what is just. This requires both prudence and the habit of justice. In Questions 61–62, Aquinas divides particular justice into distributive justice (geometrical proportion in sharing common goods) and commutative justice (arithmetic equality in exchanges). Moreover, he establishes that restitution of stolen goods, unjust damage, or injured reputation is necessary for salvation. Question 62 explains the strict duty of restitution for anyone who takes, keeps, or cooperates in taking another's goods or good name. Restitution (restoring strict equality by returning what was unjustly taken or repairing unjust harm) is necessary for salvation under commutative justice.

The story inside

Why is it wiser to risk being mistaken by thinking well of an evil person than to risk thinking evil of a good person? In Question 60, Articles 3 and 4, Aquinas contrasts theoretical science with judging human beings. When someone judges an inanimate object or weather forecast wrongly, the object suffers no injury. But when we judge another person to be wicked based on slight and doubtful signs without solid proof, we despise and injure our neighbor in our heart. No one knows another's hidden intentions with certainty. Therefore, charity and justice require that whenever a neighbor's action can reasonably be understood in a good way, we interpret it for the best rather than condemning him rashly. Judging a neighbor's doubtful actions charitably protects justice and honors human dignity.

Lessons worth keeping

  1. 1

    Justice is the constant and perpetual will to render to each person his due right (jus). In doing so, it orders human beings in their relations with others.

  2. 2

    Natural right is based on human nature itself. No human decree can ever make what is contrary to natural right lawful.

  3. 3

    Rash judgment sins against justice by interpreting a neighbor's doubtful deeds as evil without sufficient evidence; where certainty is lacking, we must interpret doubts in our neighbor's favor.

  4. 4

    Restitution (restoring strict equality by returning what was unjustly taken or repairing unjust harm) is necessary for salvation under commutative justice.

Test your recall

What is the difference between distributive justice and commutative justice?

Answer from memory first. Then check the summary and lessons above.

Notes & sources

3 notes

From Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part, Questions 47–79: Treatise on Prudence and Justice, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1918). Line numbers show where each passage appears in the digitized text.

  1. 1.
    Lines 5297–5298
    “V.) is a written decree: and so law is not the same as right, but an expression of right.”
  2. 2.
    Lines 6612–6615
    “On the contrary, Ambrose says [De Offic. i.): It is justice that renders to each one what is his, and claims not another's property; it disregards its own profit in order to preserve the common equity.”
  3. 3.
    Lines 7534–7538
    “Ohj. 3. Further, A law is written in order that the lawgiver’s intention may be made clear. But it happens sometimes that even if the lawgiver himself were present he would judge otherwise. Therefore we ought not always to judge according to the written law.”

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