Section XXIX · Location 29 of 80
Section 29 · Open to readFrom Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas
Edition: Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part, Questions 47–79: Treatise on Prudence and Justice, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1918)
Second Part of the Second Part — The Virtue of Prudence, Its Parts, the Gift of Counsel, and Contrary Vices (Questions 47–56)
Summa Theologica · Chapter 29 summary
Prudence is right reason applied to action. Its principal act is not merely thinking about good deeds, but commanding that they be done. True prudence cannot exist without the moral virtues, which rightly order the appetite toward the true ends of human life.
Atlas of Saints wrote this summary of section 29 of Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas. It uses our own words. It is not a quotation from the book.
Cite this summary
Atlas of Saints. “Second Part of the Second Part — The Virtue of Prudence, Its Parts, the Gift of Counsel, and Contrary Vices (Questions 47–56)” Summary of Summa Theologica, by Saint Thomas Aquinas. https://www.atlasofsaints.com/writings/summa-theologica/chapters/29#atlas-answer
Section breakdown
Thomas Aquinas opens his treatise on the four cardinal virtues. Then he examines prudence, defined as 'right reason about things to be done' (recta ratio agibilium). Residing in the practical intellect yet presupposing a right will toward human ends through the moral virtues, prudence performs three acts. This involves taking counsel (inquiring into means), judging rightly what has been discovered, and commanding action—which is its chief and defining act. Prudence requires eight integral components (memory, understanding, docility, shrewdness, reason, foresight, circumspection, and caution). It also extends beyond private life to household, civic, and military governance. In addition, it is perfected by the Holy Spirit's Gift of Counsel. Moreover, it is opposed both by defect (precipitation, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, and negligence) and by false resemblance (prudence of the flesh, craftiness, guile, Fraud, and over-anxious solicitude).
In Questions 47–49, Thomas Aquinas defines prudence as right reason about human actions whose chief act is command (`imperium`). He also proves its mutual dependence with the moral virtues. In addition, he analyzes its eight integral parts. These include memory, understanding, docility, shrewdness (`solertia`), reason, foresight, circumspection, and caution. In Question 47, natural synderesis appoints the universal ends of moral virtues. At the same time, prudence determines the concrete means to reach those ends. In Questions 50–52, Aquinas distinguishes personal, domestic, regnative, political, and military prudence, pairs prudence with its three potential virtues (`eubulia` for good counsel, `synesis` for common-sense judgment, and `gnome` for higher equitable judgment). Moreover, he shows how the Gift of Counsel perfects prudence under the Holy Spirit's guidance.
Question 50 includes military prudence among the subjective species of prudence that defend the common good against external attack. In Questions 53–56, Aquinas classifies the vices opposed to prudence into defects rooted chiefly in lust (precipitation, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, and negligence) and false semblances rooted chiefly in covetousness (prudence of the flesh, craftiness, guile, fraud, and excessive anxiety for temporal things). In Question 55, the vices of craftiness, guile, and fraud counterfeit true prudence mostly from covetousness. Craftiness (astutia) and prudence of the flesh are counterfeit forms of prudence that use cleverness for carnal ends or through deceitful paths.
The story inside
People often call a scheming merchant or a clever thief 'prudent' when he devises an ingenious plan to outwit others and gain wealth. In Question 47, Article 13 and Question 55, Aquinas explains why this is a dangerous confusion of words. True prudence requires both a genuinely good end (the right ordering of one's whole human life toward virtue) and true, lawful means to reach it. A clever robber who plans a successful heist possesses a counterfeit cleverness that Aristotle calls 'deinotes' (mere cleverness) and Scripture calls 'craftiness' (astutia). His goal is evil or his paths are fictitious and deceitful. Therefore, his cleverness is not a virtue at all, but a sin against prudence. Cleverness without moral goodness and honest means is never prudence, but a counterfeit vice.
Lessons worth keeping
- 1
Prudence is right reason applied to action. Its principal act is not merely thinking about good deeds, but commanding that they be done.
- 2
True prudence cannot exist without the moral virtues, which rightly order the appetite toward the true ends of human life.
- 3
Docility (the humble readiness to learn from the experience of elders and wise teachers) is an essential part of prudence. This is because no single person can discover every contingency alone.
- 4
Craftiness (astutia) and prudence of the flesh are counterfeit forms of prudence that use cleverness for carnal ends or through deceitful paths.
Test your recall
Why is commanding an action—rather than merely taking counsel or forming a judgment—the principal act of prudence?
Answer from memory first. Then check the summary and lessons above.
Notes & sources
3 notesFrom Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part, Questions 47–79: Treatise on Prudence and Justice, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1918). Line numbers show where each passage appears in the digitized text.
- 1.Lines 251–255
“After treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence consider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall consider prudence in itself; secondly, its parts; thirdly, the corresponding gift; fourthly, the contrary vices; fifthly, the precepts concerning prudence.”
- 2.Lines 1392–1394
“Now no man can be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral, ii.) that the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect prudently what they desire to accomplish.”
- 3.Lines 3839–3842
“Ohj. 3. Further, Prudence consists in acts of the practical reason, viz. counsel, judgment about what has been counselled, and command. Now thought precedes all these acts, since they belong also to the speculative intellect.”
