Section XXII · Location 22 of 80
Section 22 · Open to readFrom Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas
Edition: Aquinas Ethicus: The Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, Volume I, trans. Father Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (1896)
First Part of the Second Part — Questions XXII–XLVIII: The Passions of the Soul: Love, Desire, Pleasure, Sorrow, Hope, Fear, and Anger
Summa Theologica · Chapter 22 summary
Against Stoic rigorism, the eleven sensitive passions are morally good whenever they are moderated and commanded by right reason. Every passion springs from Love as its first root.
Atlas of Saints wrote this summary of section 22 of Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas. It uses our own words. It is not a quotation from the book.
Cite this summary
Atlas of Saints. “First Part of the Second Part — Questions XXII–XLVIII: The Passions of the Soul: Love, Desire, Pleasure, Sorrow, Hope, Fear, and Anger” Summary of Summa Theologica, by Saint Thomas Aquinas. https://www.atlasofsaints.com/writings/summa-theologica/chapters/22#atlas-answer
Section breakdown
In Questions XXII–XLVIII of the Prima Secundae, Saint Thomas Aquinas presents his celebrated Treatise on the Passions—a psychological and moral analysis of human emotion. Where in the human person do passions reside? "R. Passion is properly found where there is a" (lines 5569..5569) bodily change accompanying an appetite movement; hence passions belong strictly to the sensitive appetite. There emotions like fear or anger stir the heart and blood. Even so, spiritual affections of joy and love exist without bodily change in the rational will. The sensitive appetite is divided into two powers: the concupiscible appetite, which looks at sensible good or evil simply as pleasurable or painful, and the irascible appetite, which rises up to fight obstacles when a good is hard to win or an evil is hard to escape. From this distinction come eleven distinct species of passion: six in the concupiscible power (love and hatred, desire and aversion, pleasure and sorrow) and five in the irascible power (hope and despair, daring and fear, and anger, which has no opposite passion).
Are these passions moral diseases that a wise person must uproot completely, as the ancient Stoics taught, or can they belong to virtue, as Aristotle and the Peripatetics held? Aquinas shows that the dispute arose largely because the Stoics failed to distinguish the sensitive appetite from the rational will. They called every sudden, unreasoning emotional commotion a "disease". By contrast, the Peripatetics called every movement of the sensitive appetite a "passion". He also saw that when these emotions are guided and moderated by right reason, they are morally good. Indeed, human virtue is more complete when the rational will not only chooses the good itself. However, overflows into the sensitive appetite so that the whole human person (heart, feelings, and body) moves promptly toward the good. Moreover, when reason intentionally stirs up righteous compassion or courage to execute a noble deed more vigorously.
At the fountainhead of all the passions stands Love. Every action and every other emotion springs from love: love is the first proportion or affinity of the appetite to a good. From love arises desire when the loved good is absent, and joy when it is present. At the same time, hatred, fear, and sorrow arise only because some evil threatens what we love. Aquinas distinguishes two forms of love that work together in every genuine affection: "love of friendship" (amor amicitiae). Through this, we wish good to the beloved person for his own sake, and "love of concupiscence" (amor concupiscentiae), by which we desire a particular good for ourselves or for that friend. Even hatred depends entirely on love. No one can hate being or truth in general. Moreover, someone hates a particular truth. In response, it is only because he loves some disordered wish or hidden fault. He also fears being exposed or rebuked by the truth.
Questions XXXI–XXXIX examine Pleasure (delight) and Sorrow (interior pain). "R. Pleasures arise from union with a suitable" (lines 6522..6522) good when the appetite rests in possessing it. Moreover, he knows that it possesses it. Bodily and sensual pleasures feel more vehement to most people (both because sense objects are more familiar to us and because bodily pleasures act like sharp medicines that relieve a stinging bodily need or weariness). Even so, spiritual and intellectual delights are in themselves far greater, purer, and more lasting. This is because the intellect unites more intimately with eternal, unchangeable truth than the senses ever can with fleeting matter. Against those who claimed all pleasure is evil, Aquinas demonstrates that pleasure perfects human action by focusing the mind's attention. At the same time, disordered bodily pleasures hinder reason. A person rejoices when he reaches what he loves. Therefore, the surest test of a person's moral character is what gives him pleasure or sorrow. A good man delights in acts of justice and truth, whereas a corrupt man delights in vice. The soul is weighed down by sorrow. In response, Aquinas prescribes five practical remedies that console and lighten grief: first, any lawful pleasure or recreation, which acts like rest to a weary body. Second, tears and groans, which let the pent-up inner distress flow outward. Third, the sympathy and condolence of friends, who seem to share the heavy load on their own shoulders and prove we are still loved. Fourth, the contemplation of divine truth, which lifts the mind above earthly loss. Moreover, fifth, sleep and warm baths, which restore the exhausted bodily frame and calm thevital spirits.
Finally, Questions XL–XLVIII trace the five irascible passions. Hope stretches toward a future good that is arduous (difficult) yet possible to attain—whether by one's own power or through the help of a friend—and therefore spurs a person to energetic effort. Fear recoils from a future evil that looms near and is hard to resist, with bodily death as its greatest natural terror. Moderate fear makes a person careful and eager to take wise counsel, whereas overwhelming fear paralyzes action. Daring (audacia) is the opposite of fear, charging out to conquer a threatening danger. Last of all is Anger, which arises when someone perceives an unjust slight or injury done to himself or his friends and rises up to seek vindication. "And therefore the passion of anger may be said to" (lines 7770..7770) combine two contrary passions—sorrow over the injury suffered and hopeful pleasure in the prospect of just redress. Anger seeks punishment only under the aspect of justice and wishes the offender to see and amend his fault. Therefore, anger is far less grave than hatred, which coldly wishes evil to another person simply as evil, and unlike enduring hatred, anger burns out quickly once its heat has passed.
The story inside
Passions properly reside in the sensitive appetite. There appetite movements are accompanied by a bodily transmutation (such as a quickened pulse). They are divided into six concupiscible passions (regarding good or evil simply: love, hatred, concupiscence/desire, aversion, pleasure/joy, sorrow) and five irascible passions (regarding arduous good or evil: hope, despair, fear, daring, and anger, which has no contrary). The Stoics wrongly called every passion a disease and morally evil, only because they confused sensitive passions with disordered movements of reason. The Peripatetics (Aristotle) rightly taught that passions are morally good and belong to virtue when moderated by reason. Love—split into love of concupiscence (desiring a good for someone) and love of friendship (wishing good to the beloved himself)—is the root of every other passion. No one can hate truth in general or hate any thing except because of a prior love with which that thing clashes.
Lessons worth keeping
- 1
Against Stoic rigorism, the eleven sensitive passions are morally good when governed by right reason. Every passion has its root in Love.
- 2
Spiritual delights surpass bodily pleasures in purity and stability, and human sorrow is relieved by five remedies. These include lawful recreation, tears, sympathetic friends, contemplation of truth, and bodily rest.
- 3
The irascible passions contend with arduous goods and evils, and anger differs from hatred. This is because anger seeks vindication under the aspect of justice rather than wishing evil simply for its own sake.
Test your recall
How do ignorance, passion, fear, and force affect whether a human action is voluntary or involuntary, and what three elements must all be good for an act to be morally good?
Answer from memory first. Then check the summary and lessons above.
Notes & sources
3 notesFrom Aquinas Ethicus: The Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, Volume I, trans. Father Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (1896). Line numbers show where each passage appears in the digitized text.
- 1.Lines 5646–5648
“And therefore it was necessary that there should be another faculty to tend to such arduous good; and that is the irascible faculty.”
- 2.Lines 6321–6323
“Hence desire, properly speaking, is in the sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible faculty, so called from desiring (concupiscence).”
- 3.Lines 7314–7316
“R. Touching the object of hope, four conditions are to be considered. First, it must be good; and hereby hope differs from fear, which is of evil.”
