Section XXI · Location 21 of 80
Section 21 · Open to readFrom Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas
Edition: Aquinas Ethicus: The Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, Volume I, trans. Father Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (1896)
First Part of the Second Part — Questions I–XXI: Man’s Last End, True Beatitude, Voluntary Action, Choice, and Moral Good and Evil
Summa Theologica · Chapter 21 summary
Human actions are properly those that proceed from reason and deliberate will toward a final end. Moreover, the human will is ordered to the universal good. Therefore, no created wealth, honor, power, or pleasure can constitute man's Beatitude, which rests in the vision of God alone.
Atlas of Saints wrote this summary of section 21 of Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas. It uses our own words. It is not a quotation from the book.
Cite this summary
Atlas of Saints. “First Part of the Second Part — Questions I–XXI: Man’s Last End, True Beatitude, Voluntary Action, Choice, and Moral Good and Evil” Summary of Summa Theologica, by Saint Thomas Aquinas. https://www.atlasofsaints.com/writings/summa-theologica/chapters/21#atlas-answer
Section breakdown
In the opening questions of the Prima Secundae, Saint Thomas Aquinas examines the goal of human life and the inner structure of free moral action. Not every action performed by a human being is properly a "human act." Stroking one's beard absentmindedly or digesting food is an "act of a man", but not a human act. Only those actions are properly human that proceed from a deliberate will. There a person is master of his own deed through reason and free choice. Every deliberate human action is directed toward an end. Moreover, a chain of desired ends cannot run on without a first source of desire. Therefore, all human choices depend on a Last End that completely satisfies the human appetite: Happiness, or Beatitude.
Where can human beings find true Happiness? Aquinas tests every candidate proposed by worldly custom and ancient philosophy. Happiness cannot consist in wealth (whether natural wealth like food and shelter or artificial wealth like money). This is because money is desired only as a tool to buy other things. By contrast, the Last End is loved for its own sake. It cannot consist in honors or human fame and glory, which depend on the fickle opinions of other people and often reward flatterers and wrongdoers. It cannot consist in worldly power, which can be used for evil as well as good. Nor in bodily health, beauty, or strength, which are shared and even surpassed by beasts. Nor in bodily pleasures, which belong only to the senses. Not even the created goods of the soul itself can be man's supreme happiness. This is because the object of the human will is the Universal Good. In the same way, the object of the intellect is Universal Truth. "R. Whoever is capable of perfect good, can" (lines 3467..3467) be satisfied by nothing less than the uncreated Sovereign Good—God Himself. In its essence, perfect Beatitude is the act of the highest power in us, the speculative intellect. In doing so, he beholds the Divine Essence in heaven, overflowing into the will as unceasing joy and into the glorified body at the resurrection.
Because we reach or lose Beatitude through our free actions, Questions VI–XVII examine what makes an act voluntary or involuntary. "R. There must be a voluntary element in human" (lines 3788..3788) actions for them to deserve moral praise or blame. An act is voluntary when it springs from an interior principle (the will) guided by knowledge of the end. Can exterior violence ever force the human will? Outward violence can drag a person's limbs by superior physical strength, leaving the interior will wholly unconsenting. However, no created power can ever force the interior act of the will itself. What about actions done out of fear—such as a sea captain throwing precious cargo into the sea during a tempest to save his ship? Considered in the abstract, no captain wants to throw away his goods. Yet here and now, to escape drowning, he deliberately chooses to cast them overboard, so the act remains voluntary in concrete reality, though mixed with an involuntary aspect. By contrast, concupiscence (strong passion or desire) actually makes an act more voluntary. This is because the will inclines toward what it desires, diminishing guilt only insofar as sudden passion clouds the judgment of reason without completely taking away free choice. Ignorance causes involuntariness and excuses from sin only when it is "antecedent" (invincible ignorance of a fact one had no duty or way to know). "consequent" ignorance (where someone deliberately avoids learning the truth so he can sin more freely, or negligently fails to learn the moral duties of his state) never excuses completely.
Questions XVIII–XXI then show how a voluntary action becomes morally good or evil. "The human act which is called moral takes its" (lines 4622..4622) primary moral character from its object—that is, the deed itself considered in relation to right reason (for instance, taking what belongs to another is evil in its very object, whereas clothing the naked is good). To the object are added the intention of the end (why the agent acts) and the circumstances (who, what, where, by what aids, how, and when). For an action to be morally good, its object, its intention, and its circumstances must all be upright. If any single one is bad, the whole action is corrupted. An action considered in the abstract (such as walking in a field) may be morally indifferent. At the same time, no deliberate concrete action performed by an individual person is ever morally indifferent. This is because every deliberate choice is ordered either toward or against a rational end—and in someone who has sanctifying grace, every deliberate act directed to a fitting human purpose is referred at least virtually to God.
Finally, Aquinas resolves the classic question of an erring conscience. Does an erring reason or conscience bind? Yes, absolutely: because the will can only choose an object as presented to it by reason, anyone who acts against what his conscience judges to be God's command wills evil directly and therefore sins. Yet if a person's conscience errs in thinking a bad action is good, does that error excuse him from sin? It excuses him only when the error arises from invincible ignorance of some particular fact without any negligence on his part. His conscience errs because he willfully or negligently failed to know God's law or natural moral principles he was bound to know. In that case, he sins both if he disobeys his conscience and if he follows it—not because he is trapped without escape. However, because he can and must lay aside his culpable ignorance and form his conscience rightly.
The story inside
Only actions proceeding from a deliberate will are properly called human acts. This is because man is master of his acts by reason and will. Every human action aims at a last end that satisfies desire completely. That last end—Happiness or Beatitude—cannot consist in wealth (which is sought only as a useful tool), honors, fame, power, bodily health, sensual pleasure, or any created good of the soul. This is because the object of the will is the universal good, which is found in God alone. Beatitude is an activity of the speculative intellect contemplating divine truth, accompanied by delight in the will. Perfect beatitude (seeing the Divine Essence) surpasses the natural power of every creature and is attained in heaven by God's gift. At the same time, imperfect happiness is shared in this life through virtue and contemplation.
Lessons worth keeping
- 1
God alone is man's true Beatitude, because no created wealth, honor, power, or pleasure can satisfy the will's desire for the Universal Good.
- 2
Outward violence cannot force the interior will, fear and concupiscence leave deliberate choice intact. Only invincible antecedent ignorance excuses an act as involuntary.
- 3
A concrete human act is good only when its object, intention, and circumstances all accord with reason. Moreover, while acting against an erring conscience is always wrong, culpable ignorance of God's law does not excuse.
Test your recall
Why does eternal beatitude consist in the vision of the Divine Essence rather than in wealth, power, bodily pleasure, or any created good?
Answer from memory first. Then check the summary and lessons above.
Notes & sources
3 notesFrom Aquinas Ethicus: The Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, Volume I, trans. Father Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (1896). Line numbers show where each passage appears in the digitized text.
- 1.Lines 2613–2616
“The first is that, happiness being the supreme good of man, no evil is compatible with it, but all the aforesaid things may be found in good men and evil men alike.”
- 2.Lines 3725–3727
“But to have happiness naturally is proper to God alone. Hence it is proper to God alone not to travel towards happiness by any previous activity.”
- 3.Lines 4622–4624
“The human act which is called moral takes its species from its object, as that object stands related to the principle of human acts, which is reason.”
