Section LXIX · Location 69 of 80
Section 69 · Open to readFrom Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas
Edition: Aquinas Ethicus: The Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, Volume II, trans. Father Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (1896)
Second Part of the Second Part (Moral Compendium) — Questions XLVII–LXXIX: Prudence, Right, Justice, Restitution, Self-Defence, Property, Trade, and Usury
Summa Theologica · Chapter 69 summary
True Prudence counsels, judges, and commands moral action in view of the final end of all human life. At the same time, Justice renders to each his right through distributive proportion and commutative equality, binding to restitution.
Atlas of Saints wrote this summary of section 69 of Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas. It uses our own words. It is not a quotation from the book.
Cite this summary
Atlas of Saints. “Second Part of the Second Part (Moral Compendium) — Questions XLVII–LXXIX: Prudence, Right, Justice, Restitution, Self-Defence, Property, Trade, and Usury” Summary of Summa Theologica, by Saint Thomas Aquinas. https://www.atlasofsaints.com/writings/summa-theologica/chapters/69#atlas-answer
Section breakdown
Volume II of Aquinas Ethicus opens with Saint Thomas Aquinas's treatises on Prudence and Justice (Secunda Secundae, Questions XLVII–LXXIX). Prudence resides in the practical reason, whose office is to take counsel, judge, and command what is to be done in concrete action. Does prudence belong only to rulers? "But to rule and govern is not the office of the" (lines 1893..1893) subject as subject. Yet because every rational human being governs his own actions by free choice, every person needs prudence. Aquinas distinguishes three things called prudence. First, "false prudence", when a sinner devises clever schemes for an evil end, like a "prudent burglar"; second, "imperfect prudence", when someone is skilled in a particular craft like navigation or commerce. Moreover, third, "true and perfect prudence", which rightly counsels, judges, and commands in view of the good end of all human life. Which can exist only with sanctifying grace and charity.
Next comes Justice (Questions LVII–LXII), whose object is Right (jus)—either natural right (founded on human nature itself) or positive right (established by human agreement or civil law). "R. Justice directs a man in his relations with" (lines 2390..2390) other people, establishing equality between them, and is defined as "the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right." Its act is judgment, which is lawful only when free from rash suspicion. A person steals no harm by thinking well of an unworthy man, whereas he wrongs an innocent man gravely. He does this by thinking ill of him without solid proof. Therefore, we are bound to interpret doubts about our neighbor favorably. Justice has two species. Distributive Justice distributes common honors, offices, and burdens proportionally according to each person's fitness for the common good (violated by "respect of persons," as when a bishop or ruler confers a post out of family favoritism rather than merit). At the same time, Commutative Justice maintains strict arithmetic equality in exchanges and injuries between individuals. Anyone takes another's property or damages his goods or reputation. In response, Commutative Justice strictly binds the wrongdoer (along with anyone who commanded, counseled, consented to, or sheltered the crime) to make full restitution before he can be saved.
In Questions LXIV and LXVI, Aquinas sets down landmark principles on human life and property. Killing any innocent person is intrinsically evil under all circumstances. Executing a dangerous criminal who threatens the life of the commonwealth belongs solely to the public authority entrusted with the care of the whole community (just as a physician amputates a gangrenous limb to save the body). Moreover, he is never lawful for a private individual. Suicide is always a mortal sin for three reasons: it violates natural charity toward oneself, it robs the community of a member, and it usurps the supreme dominion over life and death that belongs to God alone. What if a private person is attacked by an unjust aggressor? In Question LXIV, Article 7, Aquinas formulates the famous principle of double effect: nothing prevents a single act from having two effects, only one of which is intended. At the same time, the other is beside the intention (praeter intentionem). An innocent person defends his life against an attacker. In response, his intention must be solely to save his own life, not to take vengeance or kill. He uses only the moderate force necessary to ward off the blow and the attacker dies. In that case, the defender is free of guilt. By contrast, if he uses more violence than necessary, his act is unlawful.
Regarding property (Question LXVI), how should we view material goods? "R. An exterior thing may be considered in two" (lines 4090..4090) ways: first, regarding the power of managing and disposing of property, private ownership is lawful and even necessary for human life for three reasons:. This is because everyone takes more careful charge of what belongs to him alone than of what is left to a crowd. Because human affairs are managed more orderly when each person has his distinct duty. Moreover, because society stays more peaceful when each is contented with his own, whereas common ownership breeds endless quarrels. Second, regarding the use of exterior goods, a person must not hold them as exclusively his own. However, as common, ready to share them with others in their need. And in a case of urgent and manifest extreme necessity (where a person is in immediate danger of starving and has no other resource) all things become common by natural law, so that taking what is strictly needed to sustain life from another's abundance is neither theft nor robbery.
Finally, Questions LXVII–LXXIX apply justice to law courts, everyday speech, commerce, and money-lending. In court, a judge acts as a public person. In addition, he must pronounce sentence according to the evidence proved in the trial, not his private knowledge. An advocate (lawyer) who knowingly defends an unjust lawsuit sins gravely. In addition, he must make restitution to the party who lost through his unjust pleading. Outside court, backbiting (detraction) steals a neighbor's good name in secret—a worse injury than stealing gold. Indeed, a good name is the most precious temporal possession. In addition, he binds the backbiter to retract his falsehood or repair the damaged reputation. At the same time, tale-bearing (whispering to sow discord between friends) is the gravest of all sins of speech against a neighbor. In trade (Question LXXVII), buying and selling must observe the just price: using short measures, selling adulterated goods, or concealing a hidden defect that makes an article dangerous or less valuable (like a diseased horse or a tottering house) is fraud binding to restitution. Even so, a seller is not bound to announce an obvious defect if he lowers the price fairly. Nor is he bound to tell buyers that fresh grain caravans are arriving soon. Merchants may lawfully earn a moderate profit as a stipend for their labor in transporting, storing, or improving goods. This holds provided that they seek profit not as a greedy last end. However, to support their families and relieve the poor. In Question LXXVIII, Usury (demanding a price for the mere loan of money) is condemned as intrinsically unjust. Money was invented for exchange and its use consists in spending it. Therefore, charging separately for the money lent and for the use of that money sells the same thing twice, or sells what does not exist.
The story inside
Prudence resides in the practical reason and rightly counsels, judges. Moreover, it commands what is to be done in view of the end of all human life. Every rational human being (even a subject) shares in prudence so far as he governs his own free choices. True and perfect prudence cannot exist in sinners. They possess at most either 'false prudence' (cleverness in arranging means for a bad end, like a prudent burglar) or 'imperfect prudence' in a particular trade. Prudence requires eight integral parts (memory, understanding, docility, shrewdness, reason, foresight, circumspection, and caution) and encompasses personal, domestic, and political prudence. At the same time, prudence of the flesh, craftiness, guile, fraud, and anxious solicitude for temporal things oppose it.
Lessons worth keeping
- 1
True Prudence directs concrete action to the good end of all human life. At the same time, Justice renders to each his right through distributive proportion and commutative equality, requiring restitution for injury.
- 2
Killing the innocent and suicide are always evil. Self-defence is lawful under the principle of double effect when using proportionate force to save one's life. Moreover, private property is necessary for order and peace while extreme necessity makes goods common.
- 3
Justice in courts, speech, and trade forbids defending unjust lawsuits, binds backbiters to restore stolen reputations, requires sellers to disclose hidden defects and keep the just price, and condemns usury.
Test your recall
Why must commutative justice make exact restitution of stolen goods or damaged reputation, and why is secret backbiting a grave sin against a neighbor?
Answer from memory first. Then check the summary and lessons above.
Notes & sources
3 notesFrom Aquinas Ethicus: The Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, Volume II, trans. Father Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (1896). Line numbers show where each passage appears in the digitized text.
- 1.Lines 1889–1892
“R. Prudence lies in the reason. Now reason's proper office is to rule and govern; and therefore it is proper to every one to have reason and prudence, in so far as he has any part in ruling and governing.”
- 2.Lines 2894–2899
“In all transactions such as these enumerated, whether voluntary or involuntary, the same principle holds of fixing the mean according to an even balance of give and take. And therefore the said transactions all belong to one species of justice, namely, commutative.”
- 3.Lines 4143–4147
“Another thing within the reach of man regardingexterior goods is the use of them. In that respect a man ought not to hold exterior goods as exclusively his own, but as common possessions, so as readily to share them with others in their need.”
