Section XXXVIII · Location 38 of 80
Section 38 · Open to readFrom Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas
Edition: Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part, Questions 101–140: Piety, Observance, and the Treatise on Fortitude, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1922)
Second Part of the Second Part — Lying, Hypocrisy, Boasting, Irony, Friendliness, Flattery, Quarrelling, Liberality, Covetousness, Prodigality, Epikeia, and the Precepts of Justice (Questions 110–122)
Summa Theologica · Chapter 38 summary
Every lie is disordered by its very nature because speech was instituted to signify what is in the mind. Even so, an 'officious' lie told to save someone from harm without injuring God or neighbor is a venial rather than a mortal sin. Affability or friendliness is a genuine moral virtue. This is because human beings need cheerful, respectful companionship in daily life in order to live well.
Atlas of Saints wrote this summary of section 38 of Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas. It uses our own words. It is not a quotation from the book.
Cite this summary
Atlas of Saints. “Second Part of the Second Part — Lying, Hypocrisy, Boasting, Irony, Friendliness, Flattery, Quarrelling, Liberality, Covetousness, Prodigality, Epikeia, and the Precepts of Justice (Questions 110–122)” Summary of Summa Theologica, by Saint Thomas Aquinas. https://www.atlasofsaints.com/writings/summa-theologica/chapters/38#atlas-answer
Section breakdown
Questions 110 through 122 complete the treatise on Justice and its annexed virtues. Opposed to truthfulness are lying (speaking contrary to what one thinks in one's mind, divided into mischievous, officious, and jocose lies—where every lie is a sin because words are naturally signs of thought, though officious and jocose lies are venial unless they injure charity), hypocrisy and dissimulation (lying by outward deeds or religious vesture). In doing so, he boasts (claiming to be greater than one is), and irony (belittling one's real gifts insincerely). Questions 114–116 examine friendliness or affability—the moral debt of behaving agreeably toward companions in daily life—contrasted with flattery (praising another's sin or vanity) and quarrelling (contradicting others out of hatred or pride). Questions 117–119 treat liberality, which moderates attachment to money. As a result, one uses wealth generously for good, opposed to covetousness and prodigality. Finally, Question 120 crowns the entire treatise with epikeia (equity), the higher rule of justice that sets aside the literal words of a human law when following the letter in an unusual crisis would defeat the lawgiver's intention and harm the common good.
In Questions 110–113, Thomas Aquinas argues that every lie is a sin against truthfulness. This is because words are naturally signs of thought. At the same time, he separates mortal mischievous lies from venial officious and jocose lies, alongside hypocrisy, boasting, and irony. In Question 110, the Hebrew midwives in Exodus were rewarded by God for their merciful fear of God and saving of infants, not for their verbal lie. In Questions 114–119, Aquinas establishes friendliness (affability) and liberality as moral virtues annexed to justice. In doing so, he contrasted them with flattery, quarrelling, covetousness, and prodigality.
In Question 117, the liberal man regulates his inner affection toward money according to right reason. In Questions 120–122, Aquinas defines epikeia (equity) as a superior rule of human acts that sets aside the letter of human law when literal observance in a particular emergency would violate natural justice and the common good. Question 121 links the Gift of Piety and the Ten Commandments to the perfection of justice. Epikeia (equity) is the highest form of legal justice. An unforeseen emergency makes literal compliance with a human law destructive of justice. In response, equity follows the lawgiver's true intention for the common good.
The story inside
Human lawmakers must frame general rules for what happens in the majority of cases. Therefore, no written law can foresee every possible emergency. In Question 120, Aquinas illustrates why blind devotion to the literal words of a law can sometimes become a crime against justice itself. Suppose a law commands that a sword deposited for safekeeping must be returned to its owner when requested—yet the owner comes demanding his sword while raging in madness or threatening to murder his country's citizens. Or suppose a city law strictly forbids opening the city gates. At the same time, enemy troops are in sight—yet a band of the city's own defenders is fleeing toward the gate and will be slaughtered unless the gate is opened at once. In such emergencies, the virtue of epikeia (equity) steps above the written letter to fulfill what the lawgiver himself would have commanded had he been present: saving human life and the common good. Human laws exist to serve justice and the common good. When an emergency makes the literal letter harmful, equity fulfills the higher spirit of the law.
Lessons worth keeping
- 1
Every lie is disordered by its very nature because speech was instituted to signify what is in the mind. Even so, an 'officious' lie told to save someone from harm without injuring God or neighbor is a venial rather than a mortal sin.
- 2
Affability or friendliness is a genuine moral virtue. This is because human beings need cheerful, respectful companionship in daily life in order to live well.
- 3
Liberality frees the heart from disordered love of money. As a result, wealth can be spent readily on worthy ends. By contrast, covetousness makes man a slave to external coins.
- 4
Epikeia (equity) is the highest form of legal justice. An unforeseen emergency makes literal compliance with a human law destructive of justice. In response, equity follows the lawgiver's true intention for the common good.
Test your recall
Why does Aquinas teach that hiding the truth prudently is lawful, whereas telling a direct lie is never completely free of fault?
Answer from memory first. Then check the summary and lessons above.
Notes & sources
3 notesFrom Summa Theologica, Second Part of the Second Part, Questions 101–140: Piety, Observance, and the Treatise on Fortitude, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1922). Line numbers show where each passage appears in the digitized text.
- 1.Lines 4113–4116
“Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to their relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish their gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as stated in the Second Objection.”
- 2.Lines 5338–5341
“We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and the opposite vices which are flattery and quarrelling. Concerning friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether it is a special virtue?”
- 3.Lines 6643–6646
“Obj. 2. Further, The sin of covetousness consists in a man's exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to justice and not to Hberality.”
