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Summa Theologica

Section 13 · Saint Thomas Aquinas

Section XIII · Location 13 of 80

Section 13 · Open to read

From Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas

Edition: Summa Theologica, First Part, Questions 75–102: Treatise on Man, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1912)

First Part — The Nature, Union, and Powers of the Human Soul (Questions 75–83)

Summa Theologica · Chapter 13 summary

The human soul is an incorporeal, subsistent intellectual substance that cannot be destroyed when the body dies. Yet human nature consists of soul and body united. The intellectual soul is the sole substantial form of the human body, virtually containing the vegetative and sensitive powers within one higher form.

Atlas of Saints wrote this summary of section 13 of Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas. It uses our own words. It is not a quotation from the book.

Cite this summary

Atlas of Saints. “First Part — The Nature, Union, and Powers of the Human Soul (Questions 75–83)” Summary of Summa Theologica, by Saint Thomas Aquinas. https://www.atlasofsaints.com/writings/summa-theologica/chapters/13#atlas-answer

Section breakdown

Thomas Aquinas examines the angels and the six days of bodily creation. Then he turns to humanity, who is composed of both a spiritual soul and a physical body. The human soul is an intellectual principle that subsists on its own. This is because its act of understanding does not use a bodily organ. Yet a human being is not a soul alone, as Plato thought, but a composite of soul and body. Against Averroes and those who posited multiple souls in one body, Aquinas proves that the one intellectual soul is the single substantial form of the human body. In doing so, he gives it being, life, sensation, and reason. From this simple essence flow five genera of powers. These include vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual, culminating in the intellect, the will, and free will.

In Questions 75–76, Thomas Aquinas establishes that the human soul is an incorporeal, incorruptible, subsistent intellectual substance that is united directly to the body as its single substantial form. In doing so, he refutes both Platonic dualism and Averroes's theory of a single separate intellect for all humanity. In Question 75, the soul's mode of operation (understanding universal natures without a bodily organ) proves that its mode of existence is incorporeal and subsistent. In Questions 77–79, Aquinas demonstrates that the powers of the soul are distinct from its essence and include the vegetative powers, the five exterior and four interior senses, the passive and active intellects, intellectual memory, reason, and synderesis.

Question 78 distinguishes the powers of the soul into vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual powers according to the universality of their objects. In Questions 80–83, Aquinas distinguishes the concupiscible and irascible sensitive appetites from the rational appetite (the will). This shows that the intellect is nobler than the will in itself and that free will is a single elective power rooted in reason's comparison of particular goods. Question 79 explains why human reason and intellect are one and the same power, just as resting in a truth and moving from known principles to conclusions belong to one faculty. The will necessarily desires happiness in general as its last end. However, he exercises free will in choosing among particular goods that do not have a necessary connection to complete happiness.

The story inside

Can a human being be defined simply as a soul using a body, as Plato taught, or do all human beings share a single separate intellect, as the Arabic commentator Averroes claimed? In Questions 75 and 76, Aquinas answers both errors from the undeniable fact of human experience: 'this individual man understands.' The intellect were a separate substance shared by all men. In that case, Socrates would no more be the one who understands than a wall in which a color is seen is the one who sees. Humans would merely be phantasms thought about by a foreign mind, destroying moral responsibility. Conversely, if Socrates were only a soul using a body as a sailor uses a ship, then feeling pain or seeing colors (which require bodily organs) would not be acts of Socrates himself. The very same person both understands universal truth and senses bodily things. Therefore, the intellectual soul must be the single substantial form of each individual body. Human dignity and moral responsibility rest on the unity of the person. The very same soul that thinks immortal thoughts gives life and form to our mortal body.

Lessons worth keeping

  1. 1

    The human soul is an incorporeal, subsistent intellectual substance that cannot be destroyed when the body dies. Yet human nature consists of soul and body united.

  2. 2

    The intellectual soul is the sole substantial form of the human body, virtually containing the vegetative and sensitive powers within one higher form.

  3. 3

    The soul's essence is not identical with its act of operating. Therefore, its diverse powers flow from its essence and are distinguished by their formal objects.

  4. 4

    The will necessarily desires happiness in general as its last end. However, he exercises free will in choosing among particular goods that do not have a necessary connection to complete happiness.

Test your recall

Why must the human intellect be incorporeal rather than a bodily organ?

Answer from memory first. Then check the summary and lessons above.

Notes & sources

3 notes

From Summa Theologica, First Part, Questions 75–102: Treatise on Man, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1912). Line numbers show where each passage appears in the digitized text.

  1. 1.
    Lines 281–284
    “Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union of the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry.”
  2. 2.
    Lines 2813–2816
    “But by the one essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different degrees of perfection, as we have seen above (Q. LXXVI., AA. 3, 4). Therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of various degrees.”
  3. 3.
    Lines 5099–5101
    “Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of a different genus from that which is in the human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect.”

Location: section 13 of 80 · 16%

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